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Abstract In this paper, I analyze the illness stories narrated by a mother and her
13-year-old son as part of an ethnographic study of child chronic pain sufferers and
their families. In examining some of the moral, relational and communicative
challenges of giving an account of one’s pain, I focus on what is left out of some
accounts of illness and suffering and explore some possible reasons for these eli-
sions. Drawing on recent work by Judith Butler (Giving an Account of Oneself,
2005), I investigate how the pragmatic context of interviews can introduce a form of
symbolic violence to narrative accounts. Speciﬁcally, I use the term ‘‘genre of
complaint’’ to highlight how anthropological research interviews in biomedical
settings invoke certain typiﬁed forms of suffering that call for the rectiﬁcation of
perceived injustices. Interview narratives articulated in the genre of complaint
privilege speciﬁc types of pain and suffering and cast others into the background.
Giving an account of one’s pain is thus a strategic and selective process, creating
interruptions and silences as much as moments of clarity. Therefore, I argue that
medical anthropologists ought to attend more closely to the institutional structures
and relations that shape the production of illness narratives in interview encounters.
Keywords Chronic pain  Complaint  Illness narrative  Narrative positioning 
Medical institutions
Introduction
In a provocative critique of the concept of illness narrative, Unni Wikan (2000)
suggests that the Western academic literature artiﬁcially construes illness narratives
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DOI 10.1007/s11013-009-9162-2as being about ‘‘my illness and me,’’ while the stories of sickness she hears in the
ﬁeld and at home revolve mainly around social relationships, and complexly
intertwine with ‘‘the ongoing stories of their lives’’ (p. 218). Storytellers’
compelling concerns, Wikan argues, need not be conﬁned to the illness. And,
perhaps more radically, ‘‘An illness story need not be about illness at all, or illness
may be only a part, and not the most salient part, of what the teller (or narrator)
seeks to convey’’ (p. 230).
In this paper, I give serious consideration to the issue of what an illness
narrative—or, rather, a pair of illness narratives—is ‘‘about.’’ Speciﬁcally, I analyze
the illness stories narrated by a mother, Faith, and her 13-year-old son, Allan, who
suffers from chronic migraines, to examine what is left out of some accounts of
illness and suffering and explore some possible reasons for these elisions.
1 As I will
show, a critical part of Faith’s story concerns the kind of mother she desires to be: a
mother who responds in an ethical way to the injustices of her son’s long-lasting
pain. In what follows, I draw on recent work by Judith Butler (2005) to investigate
how the pragmatic context of storytelling interactions—in this case, the medical
anthropological research interview—shapes narrative production in critical ways.
My approach thus recognizes that narrators are constrained by their ideas about
what can and should be told in a particular setting—what Shuman (2006, p. 150)
calls ‘‘available narratives’’—and that, as Ochs and Capps (2001, p. 252)
acknowledge, ‘‘certain narratives remain untold.’’
The Politics of Storytelling
Anthropologists and sociologists have produced abundant accounts of how illness
sufferers mobilize narratives of personal experience as therapeutic resources and
meaning-making agents (Capps and Ochs 1995; Frank 1995; Garro 2003; Good
1994; Hyden 1995; Kleinman 1988; Mattingly and Garro 2000; Shohet 2007).
However, as Jackson (2002, p. 252) notes, ‘‘Stories belong to the in-between spaces
of intersubjectivity.’’ And yet, apart from Mattingly’s (1998) persuasive theory of
the narrative structure of everyday social action, relatively less scholarship has
focused on the ways in which illness stories are lived and told in relationally
constructed social worlds.
Illness narratives are often ﬁltered through complex household dynamics that
mediate their production. Reﬂecting on the collection of illness stories from people
afﬂicted with seizure disorders in Turkey, Good (1994, p. 158) recalls, ‘‘In nearly all
the narratives we heard, family politics was not only present as a subtext of many of
the stories, but was also central to the pragmatics of their telling.’’ Stories told in
such family settings emerge through interwoven multiparty conversations in which
cultural values and communicative practices may serve to conceal certain aspects of
subjective life (Throop 2008), and the right to tell one’s own troubles may be
contested (Wilce 1995). One particularly dramatic example occurs among the
Australian Aborigines of Darwin fringe camps, where giving an account of one’s
1 Following Garro and Mattingly (2000), I use ‘‘stories’’ and ‘‘narrative’’ interchangeably in this article.
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inﬁltrate the sick and render them unreliable narrators (Sansom 1982). Children may
likewise be considered incompetent narrators of their own illness experience (see
Tates and Meeuwesen 2001). However, among the few anthropologists who have
closely examined parental stories about children’s illness (cf. Bluebond-Langner
1996; Carpenter-Song 2008), little attention has been paid to the pragmatic context
of their telling.
Narrative asymmetry provides a crucial window onto cultural processes
concerned with power and agency in social relations. As Ochs and Capps (1996,
p. 33) explain, ‘‘Silencing is part of the fabric of culture in that it is critical to
socializing prevailing ideologies.’’ Moreover, the narratives borne out of storytell-
ing encounters evince the limits of narrative representation by pointing to the ways
in which narratives may pragmatically interrupt, silence or otherwise distort certain
aspects of human experience. As numerous studies have illustrated, illness
narratives are rhetorical accounts that may be designed to elicit a particular
interpretation of the condition (Charmaz 2002; Good 1994; Hyden 1995), restore the
moral position of the teller (Frank 1995; Kleinman 1988; Riessman 1990; see also
Ochs and Capps 2001) or provide a means to some other end (Brodwin 1992; Wikan
2000).
In medical anthropological research, institutional structures and clinical spaces
provide one important backdrop for the production of illness stories. Yet the
anthropological literature has only rarely considered how institutions inﬂuence the
pragmatics of illness narratives. This fact is puzzling, considering the extent to
which institutional policies and bureaucratic hurdles constrain access to research
subjects. In one notable exception, Saris (1995) embeds an analysis of one man’s
account of living with schizophrenia within a subtle critique of medical
anthropological praxis. Speciﬁcally, by suggesting that ‘‘narratives and silences
conﬁgure, even entail, one another and that both are set up by speciﬁc institutional
conﬁgurations’’ (p. 68), Saris bravely admits that anthropological research—itself
an institutional practice—may be susceptible to collusion in a sort of symbolic
violence (Bourdieu 1991; see also Estroff 1995).
2
Young (1995) likewise attends to the role of institutions—and institutional
ideologies, in particular—in shaping illness narratives. Based on ethnographic
ﬁeldwork at a Veteran’s Affairs hospital-based PTSD treatment institute, Young
argues that narratives of traumatic experiences told in psychotherapeutic settings
may reveal as much about patients’ understandings of institutional expectations for
recovery as they do about therapeutic efﬁcacy. In other words, patients may learn to
tell the kinds of stories (they think) their therapists want to hear (see also Hyden
1995; Kirmayer 2000).
This paper builds on such work on the pragmatics of illness narratives by
focusing speciﬁcally on accounting for pain in the medical anthropological
interview. In arguing that we pay close attention to the interactional dynamics of the
2 On this point, see Frank’s (2004) excellent essay on the moral imperative of asking the right questions
about pain. While Frank is focused on clinical settings and not research encounters, he highlights the
relation among institutional practices, ethical responsibility and covert forms of violence.
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researchers are told, I follow Briggs (1986, 2007) and others who have critically
examined the ideological and epistemological assumptions underlying the interview
as a dominant mode of knowledge production in qualitative inquiry.
3 According to
such critiques, social scientists have rather naively assumed that interviews afford a
relatively unproblematic view of the inner world of the speaker. Atkinson and
Silverman (1997, p. 316) view the illness narrative as a ‘‘vehicle for a neoromantic
construction of the social actor,’’ in which ethical concerns for maintaining the
integrity of the narrator’s authentic self displace considerations of verisimilitude and
representation. The view put forth here is that, rather than taking interview data at
face value, the denotational content of narrative discourse must be situated within its
pragmatic framework, in which the moral character of the protagonist is always at
stake. This suggests that even when telling stories of personal experience, the
listener is critically implicated in the narrative unfolding of events and the moral
stance that the narrator projects (Bakhtin 1981; Duranti and Brenneis 1986).
The Research Study
The interview narratives that I will turn to shortly were collected as part of a larger
interdisciplinary study of children and adolescents suffering from chronic pain.
Seventy-four children and adolescents participated in the study, which included oral
history interviews, videotaped recordings of doctor–patient interactions and
psychological questionnaires. The primary goal of the study was to examine
anxiety and self-efﬁcacy in children and adolescents with chronic pain, and to
compare patients at three university-based tertiary-care pediatric services: pain,
neurology and gastroenterology (see Clemente et al. 2008).
Prior to an initial appointment at one of these three clinics, research staff
interviewed each child and one of his or her parents at the family’s home. This
interview provided the occasion for the people I call Faith and Allan to tell the
illness stories that I examine here. As a result, Allan’s upcoming neurology
appointment was the primary condition for Faith’s and Allan’s interview
encounters. Because the purpose of the oral history interviews was to create an
oral history archive of childhood pain, the interviews elicited general biographical
information as well as more speciﬁc details about the child’s pain experience and
treatment history.
Following standard research conventions in Western medical settings, and in
contrast to the situations described by Good (1994) and Wilce (1998), the research
protocol for this study required that parents and children be interviewed separately.
Two trained researchers interviewed Faith and Allan concurrently in separate rooms
of their home, and each interview was videotaped. Since I became involved with
this study after data collection was nearly complete, my own role was primarily
limited to data analysis, and I did not interview Faith and Allan myself.
3 See Yanos and Hopper (2008) for a helpful review of Bourdieu’s work on this topic.
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Allan suffered from incapacitating migraine headaches from the time he was 4 years
old. At ﬁrst, they were somewhat rare, but they increased in intensity and frequency
over time. Faith explained:
And it’s like over—from then till now, basically what’s happened is, the
frequency would increase and the duration would increase, until ﬁnally, they
were, like, overlapping. They took over. I mean imagine like a wet paper
towel, and you take a dropper with red food coloring and you put drop, drop,
drop, drop, drop. The water spots start growing and growing until the spots
start melting into each other, and that’s sort of like his headaches over the
years, until he’s just got this headache that just—it’s like his life is one big
headache now. There is no start, there is no stop.
Faith estimated that the headaches began to come with increasing frequency
when Allan was in third grade, and that they had started melting into each other
about two and a half years before the interview.
Allan’s symptoms—including pounding around his eyes, dizziness and extreme
light sensitivity—bore the markers of classic migraine headaches. When he felt a
headache coming on, Allan would often retreat to a makeshift living room fort
constructed with blankets and chairs where he could play in complete darkness,
much to the dismay of his mother, who preferred that he lie in bed.
4 Faith’s mother,
all ﬁve of Faith’s siblings and Faith herself all experienced occasional debilitating
migraines, though none as frequently as Allan. Still, the hereditary link seemed clear
to both Faith and Allan. Faith mused, ‘‘Yeah, I mean we must have a gene that’s
labeled migraine, my gosh.’’
While Allan had tried a variety of medications, he tended to develop resistance to
the drugs quite quickly, and they soon became ineffective. Before the interview,
Allan had seen a neurologist for a short time, but the primary treatment he had
received for his migraines had been from a pediatrician and emergency room visits.
As Faith acknowledged, ‘‘One of the problems is that every time I switch jobs, we
have a new insurance company. You start over at square one. So, you know, the
most frustrating thing about this is that there has been no progress made.’’ After
much wrangling with her insurance company, Faith had received a referral to see a
new neurologist at a university hospital, which prompted Allan’s enrollment in the
present study.
The narrative account of Allan’s migraines, in both Allan’s and Faith’s
interviews, was interwoven with a more complex story of emotional pain and
family suffering. In addition to migraines, both Allan and Faith have dealt with
numerous other illness conditions. Allan was diagnosed with ‘‘failure to thrive’’ as
an infant, and was still worrisomely thin at age 13; Faith, along with Allan’s
4 In fact, Allan conducted a good portion of his interview from underneath a blanket, in order to shade his
eyes from light. In reviewing the interview transcripts, I became curious about whether Allan retreated
under the blanket when the conversation turned to particular topics that might have been difﬁcult for him
to talk about. However, I did not identify any such correlations between Allan’s physical positioning and
potentially sensitive conversational topics.
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headaches. Allan also had a number of developmental delays and learning
disabilities, including ADHD, and received special education for reading and
behavioral issues.
5 As a result of these conditions, Allan had received psychiatric
care since the third grade, and was taking Prozac and Concerta for his ADHD.
Faith, for her part, struggled with bipolar disorder, heart disease and migraines.
Several months before the interview, she was hospitalized for heart troubles and had
gallbladder surgery. According to Allan, ‘‘Well, she’s always been sick when I’m
around her. I remember very few (days) of her working, and she’s usually sleeping
or watching TV or going to the doctor’s appointment, something like that.’’ Because
of Faith’s overwhelming health problems, both Allan and his 16-year-old sister had
been sent to live with relatives for a time. Although Allan’s difﬁcult behavior and
complicated health situation became too much of a burden on Faith’s brother’s
household, Faith’s daughter was still living with a cousin and her husband and three
children at the time of our study.
Faith’s ﬁnancial struggles as a single mother and her painful marital history
further compounded the family’s health burden. Faith had worked for many years as
a teacher, but it had become more difﬁcult as her children got older. She explained,
‘‘Allan is not the kind of kid that I can just put in day care. He has a lot of problems,
and it does not work out.’’ After giving up teaching, she tried working part-time, but
she lost her insurance and the medical bills were devastating. Later, Allan’s health
problems and her own prevented her from working at all. She asked, ‘‘What
employer is going to have me work for them if 3 days a week I have to leave work
to pick up my son from school because he has a headache?’’
When Faith was pregnant with Allan, her husband lost his job and suffered what
Faith describes as a paranoid breakdown. According to Faith, ‘‘His hate list got very
long and got more and more irrational. As it got more and more irrational, I
remember thinking to myself, I can’t talk him out of this.’’ The breaking point came
when one day Faith, out of sheer exhaustion, decided to go to bed early. When she
awoke the next morning, her husband had somewhat inexplicably erased all of her
computer ﬁles and locked her out of the computer. Faith told him he had 2 weeks to
pack up and leave. Since then, his functioning had waxed and waned; he
occasionally found jobs but sometimes lived on the streets. Faith explained, ‘‘I think
he needed antipsychotic medication. I think that—I don’t think he’s actually
psychotic, but I think he’s right there on the borderline.’’
Throughout his childhood, Allan’s father faded in and out of his life, and at the
time of the interview, Allan had made a decision not to speak to his father anymore.
He explained:
I chose to do the right thing, the thing that I should have done long ago, which
I almost did a while ago, but then he came back. Then he left me again. Then
he came back. Then he left me again. Then he ﬁnally came back, he left me
again, and I’m just not going to see him until he gets help.
5 The neurologist who saw Allan after the interview indicated that Allan exhibited symptoms of
Asberger’s syndrome, a diagnosis that Faith resisted at ﬁrst, but ﬁnally accepted.
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ghost to me. That’s how bad it is. He’s nothing. He’s dead, let’s put it that way.’’
When asked if he hoped that his mother and father might get back together, he said,
‘‘Yeah, I’ve always dreamed about that. Let’s change the subject please.’’ When the
interviewer commented that some of these experiences sounded rather stressful,
Allan replied, ‘‘Yeah, they are. All my antidepressants are because of my stress.’’
Allan spoke of other life stresses, too. When asked about his worries, migraines
were not his paramount concern. Central for Allan were the gangs at his school, the
way he was teased about the appearance of his teeth and his lack of friends. He
spoke of a ‘‘stalker’’ who had already been arrested a couple of times, and said, ‘‘I’m
trying to talk my mom into letting me buy a BB gun. Anyways, she should have a
gun in the house because this is a really bad area. There’s a lot of bad people in this
area.’’ It was only after the interviewer explicitly asked, ‘‘Do you ever worry about
the headaches?’’ that Allan acknowledged, ‘‘Yeah. I worry that it’s gonna—like, I
always worry about going to sleep…. Usually when I wake up from sleeping it’s
actually a lot worse.’’
The move to his aunt and uncle’s house had been particularly difﬁcult for Allan,
since his aunt and uncle denied his pain and believed he was simply trying to avoid
school. As a result, they had stopped his medications, and his symptoms had slowly
worsened. Furthermore, Allan indicated that his uncle mistreated him and criticized
his mother. He confessed:
My uncle—child abuse. He doesn’t think it’s child abuse or anything, but my
mom told him and everything, and I showed him a little Boy Scout punch.
Like, you punch your child—you could slap the child, but you can’t have an
enclosed ﬁst. You can’t do this or this. Otherwise, it’s considered child abuse.
So when he stopped abusing, he did other things. He’d say bad things about
my mom. So basically, that place was torture. It’s either one pain or another
pain.
Allan’s statement, ‘‘It’s either one pain or another pain,’’ is admittedly
ambiguous, and my information about this uncle is somewhat limited. Nevertheless,
in what follows, I want to use this rather provocative claim as an entre ´e into a
deeper exploration of the social and relational dynamics surrounding pain, suffering
and narrative modes of communication. I hope to illustrate how and why migraines
came to occupy a central role in Faith’s narrative of suffering, even amidst other
equally harrowing forms of family distress.
Scenes of Address
Why does Faith foreground Allan’s headaches as the primary source of his
suffering? In one respect, the answer is quite obvious. After all, her son’s upcoming
neurology appointment had occasioned the family’s enrollment in a research study
concerning chronic pain in children. Given this pathway to the interview, Faith
might have (correctly) assumed that the researchers were mostly interested in
learning about her son’s migraines.
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concerning the pragmatic functions of language. According to this line of thought,
narrators position themselves with respect to their interlocutors to portray themselves
in a particular way (Linde 1993; Ochs and Capps 1996; Wortham 2000). In doing so,
they not only represent events in the world (a referential function), but also perform a
set of social relations and persuade people to view the world from a particular moral
stance. Mattingly (1998,p. 5), drawing on Austin (1962), calls this the perlocutionary
force of narrative (see also Garro and Mattingly 2000, p. 11). From this perspective,
an underlying objective of Faith’s narrative is to portray herself in a favorable light:
as a caring mother struggling through a prolonged quest to ﬁnd appropriate health
care for her son. And crucially, the type of narrative that Faith constructs within this
setting is a narrative of hope, embodied with the full potential for Allan’s neurology
clinic appointment to bear a restitutive ending.
To understand this sort of narrative framing, I draw inspiration from Judith
Butler’s (2005) recent work, Giving an Account of Oneself.
6 In this extended essay,
Butler argues that ethical responsibility must be grounded in the dyadic encounter.
For Butler, telling a story about oneself is not the same as giving an account of
oneself, since giving an account ‘‘accepts the presumption that the self has a causal
relation to the suffering of others’’ (p. 12). Giving an account is thus inherently a
moral enterprise, imbued with the narrative dimensions of sequentiality, persuasion
and authorial point of view. Butler further speciﬁes that an account of oneself
always emerges within a scene of address, and that this relational dimension of
speech structures all narrative accounts.
7 Importantly, this scene of address also
serves to interrupt the sense that this account of myself is mine alone. Butler
explains, ‘‘If it is an account of myself, and it is an accounting to someone, then I
am compelled to give the account away, to send it off, to be dispossessed of it at the
very moment that I establish it as my account’’ (p. 36).
8
How exactly does this scene of address impinge on giving an account of oneself?
Butler (2005) argues that the ‘‘I’’ cannot give a full account of itself within this
structure of address because it can never fully explain that which is prior to its own
emergence as a subject. My narrative, therefore, begins in media res, ‘‘when many
things have already taken place to make me and my story possible in language’’
(p. 39). Her larger project is then devoted to a demonstration of why this sort of
theory of subject formation, which begins with an acknowledgment of the opacity of
my own self to myself, does not, as some might otherwise suggest, undermine the
possibility of ethical responsibility.
6 Here, Butler (2005, p. 21) expands her traditional poststructuralist framework to make ‘‘eclectic use’’ of
various philosophers and critical theorists, including Adorno, Foucault, Laplanche, Levinas, Nietzsche
and Hegel. She draws heavily on psychoanalytic theory and Levinasian perspectives, while acknowl-
edging that these approaches are not always compatible.
7 As Butler explains, the notion of the scene of address presupposes an addressee, but whether or not this
addressee actually receives the account is inconsequential for the dyadic structuring of the account.
Similarly, Burke (1950) suggests that we can be our own addressees insofar as we use persuasive tactics
to convince ourselves of particular matters. In this case we have ‘‘what Mead would call an ‘I’ addressing
its ‘me’’ (p. 38).
8 This idea also resonates with the concept of ‘‘audience as co-author’’ developed by Duranti and
Brenneis (1986).
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about the relationship between ethics, responsibility and subjectivity, which lies
beyond the scope of this paper, what is particularly compelling for my purposes here
is her treatment of language within the scene of address. Drawing on work by
Emmanuel Levinas, Butler argues for close analytic attention to both the
propositional content of narrative and the rhetorical scene in which it is deployed.
For Levinas (1998, p. 32), ‘‘Language, in its expressive function, addresses and
invokes the other.’’
9 Therefore, Levinas asserts an important distinction between
saying and the said:
Is language meaningful only in its said, in its propositions in the indicative,
everywhere at least latent, in the theoretical content of afﬁrmed or virtual
judgments, in pure communication of information—in its said, in all that can
be written? Is it not meaningful in the sociality of saying [dire], in
responsibility with regard to the other person who commands the questions
and answers of the saying, and through the ‘non-presence’ or the ‘appresen-
tation’ of the interlocutor, which thus contrasts strongly with the presence of
things according to the underlying simultaneity of the given universe? (p. 164)
While Butler’s view of language as social action is well rehearsed in linguistic
anthropology (cf. Agha 2006; Duranti 1997, pp. 214–244), she departs from other
narrative theorists with her suggestion that the rhetorical dimensions of the
interlocutory scene are irreducible to the pragmatic function of narrative. As Butler
puts it, the structure of address is not a feature of narrative—it is an interruption of
narrative. Butler describes this paradoxical nature of the scene of address as follows:
And as I make a sequence and link one event with another, offering motivations
to illuminate the bridge, making patterns clear, identifying certain events or
moments of recognition as pivotal, even marking certain recurring patterns as
fundamental, I do not merely communicate something about my past, though
that is doubtless part of what I do. I also enact the self I am trying to describe;
the narrative ‘I’ is reconstituted at every moment it is invoked in the narrative
itself. That invocation is, paradoxically, a performative and non-narrative act,
even as it functions as the fulcrum for narrative itself. I am, in other words,
doing something with that ‘I’—elaborating and positioning it in relation to a
real or imagined audience—which is something other than telling a story about
it, even though ‘telling’ remains part of what I do. (Butler 2005, p. 66)
For Butler, all of this is to say that there is a violence—as a sort of disruption or
distortion—inherent to the interlocutory scene. Furthermore, she challenges the
9 Here, I ﬁnd a striking parallel between Levinas’ view of addressivity and that of Russian literary
theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. Of course, for Levinas, the fundamental relation to the other is nonreciprocal,
while Bakhtin’s orientation is dialogical. Nevertheless, Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ views of responsibility
and addressivity are remarkably similar. According to Bakhtin scholar Michael Holquist (2002, p. 3), for
Bakhtin, ‘‘The world addresses us and we are alive and human to the degree that we are answerable, i.e.,
to the degree that we can respond to addressivity. We are responsible in the sense that we are compelled to
respond, we cannot choose but give the world an answer.’’ This compulsion to respond resonates with
Levinas’ (1985) view of responsibility as ‘‘what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly,I
cannot refuse’’ (p. 101), the ‘‘essential, primary, and fundamental structure of subjectivity’’ (p. 95).
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reconstruction of a coherent life story is the ultimate therapeutic (analytic) goal.
Instead, for Butler (2005, p. 52), ‘‘Conditions of hyper-mastery, however, are no
more salutary than conditions of radical fragmentation.’’
10
Narrative Ethics
One of the primary reasons I use Butler (2005) to explore Faith’s account of Allan’s
pain is because of the way she makes ethical relations essential to understanding the
narrative address and the rhetorical effects brought to bear on the interlocutory
scene.
11 Butler borrows the notion of ‘‘giving an account of oneself’’ from
Nietzsche’s (1969) On the Genealogy of Morals. For Nietzsche, we are only forced
to give an account of our actions within a system of justice. Accountability thus
follows accusation, and is deeply embedded in moral and legal frameworks. While
Butler ultimately illustrates why this juridical stance toward ethical responsibility is
unsatisfactory, since it fails to account for the structure of address through which
any self-accounting takes place, the Nietzschean backdrop is useful for thinking
about Faith’s interactional positioning within the interview encounter. In what
follows, I would like to suggest that medical institutions, like legal ones, can serve
as key instruments of justice. In this sense, the research interview, insofar as it
indexes a crucial clinical tie, might also be viewed within a retributive framework.
As I will show, these dynamics have important consequences on the ways in which
Faith addresses her interlocutor and narrates an ethics of care.
Accounting for Maternal Responsibility
Very early on in her interview, Faith is faced with an important dilemma: how to
account for the fact that her children, for a time, had been living apart from her. One
of her interviewer’s ﬁrst questions concerns who lives in the house and how long
they have lived there. Faith replies that she had been there a year and a few months,
but that Allan had only been there for six and a half months. At the outset, therefore,
there is a discrepancy. When asked where Allan had lived previously, Faith says:
He spent the school year previous to this at my brother’s house. I had just
become overwhelmed with things and was developing depression and some
heart problems, so my two children went to live with relatives. At the end of
the school year, my brother just said, you know, ‘‘He is too much for me and
my family.’’
10 While space constraints restrict me from providing a full account of this part of her argument, it should
be noted that Butler does not deny the therapeutic utility of narrative, particularly vis-a `-vis certain
traumatic conditions. Nevertheless, she suggests, ‘‘It does not follow that, if a life needs some narrative
structure, then all of life must be rendered in narrative form’’ (Butler 2005, p. 52). For anthropological
critiques along similar lines, see Desjarlais (1992), Kirmayer (2000) and Young (1995).
11 Here, Butler is building on a rich tradition in moral philosophy positing that one’s sense of ‘‘the good’’
is inextricably tied to grasping one’s life as an unfolding story (cf., e.g., Aristotle 1953; MacIntyre 1984;
Ricoeur 1992; Taylor 1992).
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children’s removal from her care. She explains, ‘‘I was away on a religious retreat
and my heart acted up, and a nurse at the retreat took me into the ER. My family
ﬁnally stepped in and they said, ‘Listen. You know, we can’t have you—if you
die….’’’ At this point, the family decided that Allan and his sister would go to live
with other family members. Faith’s daughter was still living with a married cousin
at the time of the interview.
Thus, before Faith even begins to talk about Allan’s pain, she frames his
headaches within a larger story of her own suffering. By portraying her
hospitalization as a dramatic turning point that prompted her family to intervene
on her behalf, Faith depicts herself as playing a relatively passive role in the events
leading up to her relinquishment of caregiving responsibilities. These points become
crucial when we learn, later, that living with his uncle had important consequences
for Allan’s medical care. Moreover, insofar as narratives of pain and suffering may
be ‘‘re- (or pre-)cast as morally valenced and meaningful lived experiences’’
(Throop 2008, p. 276), Faith’s account can be seen to bestow a moral worth that
renders her an appropriate advocate for her son.
When asked to review Allan’s previous pain treatment, Faith reports that a
neurologist had begun to help Allan, but that her brother’s failure to follow
through on the treatment regimen counteracted these efforts. She reﬂects on this
development in the following way:
I think probably, eventually [the neurologist] would have helped my son.
However, that was ended when I had my—when I was taken to the hospital.
Then my son went to live with my brother. My brother didn’t believe in my
son’s headaches, and he took him off of Neurontin and everything.
In his own interview, Allan reported that his headaches got worse when his aunt
and uncle stopped giving him his medication. By the time he returned to his
mother’s house, he said, ‘‘It was like in the eights a lot. Then like right now it gets
into tens a lot more often.’’
12 It is clear, then, that Allan’s move had repercussions
for his pain management.
13
Faith’s interactional positioning within the interview encounter reveals her
strategic awareness of the ways in which she is implicated in the failure of Allan’s
medical care. Consider her statement: ‘‘When I had my—when I was taken to the
hospital.’’ This deft reformulation reveals a shift in agency from an active to a
passive voice, within which Faith’s metapragmatic verb choice (cf. Silverstein
1976; Wortham 2000, p. 172) creates a sense of powerlessness that mitigates her
responsibility for Allan’s worsening health. Faith thus asserts a subtle moral claim
about her maternal identity, and the way in which the interviewer should interpret
her prior actions.
12 The numbers refer to the 1–10 scale that Allan used to rate his pain episodes.
13 When Faith regained custody of Allan, her insurance changed and she could not return to the same
physician. She initiated the complex referral process once again, and the appointment that she ultimately
secured prompted her enrollment in our study.
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responsibility at various points throughout the interview, emphasizing the difﬁcul-
ties of raising Allan on her own. In discussing her unstable employment history, she
says, ‘‘It’s been a real trial to try to do right by my son as a single parent, to pay the
bills and to be a good mother to him as well. That has just been very
overwhelming.’’ This comment is striking both for its representation of single
motherhood as a ‘‘trial,’’ which indexically invokes notions of judgment and justice,
and for its apparent disregard for Faith’s daughter, for whom Faith’s maternal
failings are less clearly articulated (and less relevant) in the context of this
interview. Insofar as accounting for one’s actions is entrenched in the context of
judgment, Faith is already on ‘‘trial’’ within this interview; here she metapragmat-
ically positions herself as someone who has been somewhat unfairly oppressed by
such juridical frameworks. Such observations resonate with the claims of scholars
such as Frank (1995) and Kleinman (1988), who have argued that illness narratives
work to restore the moral positioning of sufferers. From their perspective, giving an
account of one’s pain is not only a moral but also a political project.
In the extract below, Faith draws on tropes of maternal sacriﬁce to portray herself
as prioritizing Allan’s care over her own personal needs.
Interviewer: You do so much caregiving for Allan. Who’s been taking care of you
through this?
Faith: Well, that’s the thing. I wish somebody was. I get very lonely. It’s
like Lisa, that’s my friend from junior high that I was telling you
about, she goes, ‘‘Faith, you need to be married. You are so designed
to be married. You’re just like a square peg in a round hole, or
whatever, trying to be single.’’ And it’s the truth. It’s the truth. I wish
that I had somebody else. You know, but it would take a very special
person to be a father to Allan. And I’m very picky. I’m not going to
bring the wrong kind of person in my home. I know so many people
that get married again, and it is just a disaster for their kids, and I just
think that they are so selﬁsh. While I would love to ﬁnd someone, and
there have been people that I’ve considered—two really came close.
But my child comes ﬁrst.
Here, the interviewer’s question provides a powerful framing device that projects
an empathic stance toward Faith’s account. Faith in turn asserts a powerful moral
claim: although her health constraints might limit the material support she can offer,
she is not the sort of mother who would place her relationship needs above the
emotional care of her children. In this respect, she makes clear, ‘‘My child comes
ﬁrst.’’ If we read Faith’s account of her separation from Allan through this stance
toward remarriage, we may interpret her maternal care in a more positive light. In
important ways, then, this account of Faith’s romantic life makes a pragmatic bid
for a favorable judgment of her mothering.
Faith’s moral accounting practices extend beyond the domain of motherhood,
however. As the interview unfolds, Faith not only positions herself as a caring—
albeit struggling—single mother, but also as a good Christian. She notes that she
was on a retreat with her church at the point at which she was hospitalized and gave
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these misfortunes. In this way, Faith draws her religious practice into her account of
pain and suffering. As she explains:
I have a God that I know is with me in my suffering and is with Allan with his
suffering, that when we cry, He cries. When Lazarus died, Jesus wept. It’s not
like he doesn’t know what we’re going through. Whatever we’re going
through, he went through worse. This is not a God that’s removed. This is
Emmanuel, God with us. It’s sort of like people say, Well, where was God
when she was raped? Well, He was there being raped. That’s the kind of God
that I have.
Much in the same way that Faith describes God as being with her in her suffering,
she relays her attunement to Allan’s ongoing pain experience. It is particularly
difﬁcult for Faith to watch Allan suffer because she herself has experienced the
debilitation of migraine headaches. In describing Allan’s troubles at school, she says:
But I sure remember how they’re like, and the last thing in the world I want to
be doing is reading a book, or trying to do a math problem. You know, so I can
only—I’m being tough with him because I have to be. There’s a part of me
that just feels so bad that I’m sending him to school at all. And I don’t want to
say anymore because I’ll start crying. [Faith laughs.]
Here, as Faith reﬂects on Allan’s difﬁculties in school, and links his struggle to her
own experience with migraines, her eyes tear and she begins to get choked up. Faith
thus embodies the sense of hopelessness she feels in the face of her son’s suffering.
14
Absent from this account of Allan’s school performance is any discussion of his
learning disabilities and special educational services, which Allan receives—and
likely will continue to receive—independently of his migraines. Despite the multiple
struggles and sources of suffering the family has endured, throughout her narrative,
Faith positions Allan’s migraines as her biggest concern. She explains,
My son is in therapy. I also receive therapy. First because I’m on
antidepressants. I’ll be on antidepressants for the rest of my life. That’s just
me. You know, I mean, I’ve been on antidepressants since I was eighteen. So
that’s just me. Right now, I’m more concerned about my son. The biggest
stressor right now in my life is his migraines.
14 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that Faith’s tearing up here is only
one of many signs of the intersubjective nature of Faith’s and Allan’s suffering. It is clear from this
example that Allan’s migraines are extremely painful for Faith. When the interviewer asks her what it is
like to sit in the waiting room with a child in pain, Faith responds, ‘‘I don’t even want to talk about it. I
mean, you just want to cry, you just want to cry.’’ To a certain extent, then, it is important to consider the
limits and possibilities of shared pain. (For more on this topic, see Das (1997, 1998), Scarry (1985) and
Wittgenstein (1953)). In much the same way that Allan’s headaches began to bleed into one another like
drops of food coloring on a wet paper towel, Faith’s and Allan’s pain seem to have become increasingly
less distinguishable. Along these same lines, when reading an early draft of this paper, Jason Throop
pointed out several interesting narrative convergences in Faith’s and Allan’s accounts of suffering. Faith
was raped and Allan was abused. Faith’s father died, while Allan’s father endured a social death. Faith
and Allan both experience migraines, and both take antidepressants. These parallels represent yet another
way in which the pain of mother and son are symbolically intertwined.
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At several points in her interview, Faith alludes to unspeakable troubles, especially
those pertaining to her status as single mother. This topic is particularly painful for
Faith, as we can see from her initial reference to her estranged husband.
Interviewer: How long have you been a single parent? Tell me about that.
Faith: You know, I love my own husband, and I have to say that the years of
our marriage were probably the happiest of my life, but he’s kind of
emotionally fragile. And as long as we didn’t have children, he could
cope. Can we pause?
Interviewer: We sure can.
Here, Faith’s request for a break suggests her emotional discomfort with this
topic of conversation. When the interview resumes, the next 10 min is devoted to
Faith’s account of her husband’s decline in mental health and eventual departure.
After telling this story eloquently, Faith refers to troubles that elude her narrative
framing.
Interviewer: How old were your children at the time he left?
Faith: My daughter was three and my son was one.
Interviewer: So you’ve been a single mom handling all of this on your own ever
since.
Faith: For about 13 years.
Interviewer: No wonder you feel overwhelmed.
Faith: Yeah, that’s a long time. And a lot of stuff has happened. A lot of
stuff has happened. A lot of stuff has gone down. I mean, I had to go
through my father’s arrest and then having him released because he
didn’t do it. I had to go through. I was raped. My father passed away.
We’ve moved several times. There was just—there are things that I
would rather not talk about.
Interviewer: Sure.
Faith’s account of her family’s suffering thereby reveals—and conceals—
troubling absences and erasures. In the same way that Allan avoids talk about his
father, Faith carefully glosses over other social difﬁculties: an arrest, a rape, a death
and other unnameable traumas.
By positioning Allan’s migraines as ‘‘the biggest stressor right now in my life,’’
Faith mitigates the role of other intertwining sources of pain. To be sure, many
details of the family’s social troubles—particularly concerning Faith’s husband—do
emerge in the interview; the social context of Allan’s suffering is not silenced
entirely. And yet, these accounts are punctuated with ‘‘things that I would rather not
talk about’’ from Faith and ‘‘Let’s change the subject please’’ from Allan. Between
one pain and another, as Allan says, the migraine takes center stage.
15
15 Of course, Faith’s reference to ‘‘things I would rather not talk about’’ performs a speciﬁc pragmatic
function. Faith might have easily chosen not to mention these distressing events at all. Instead, she alludes
to these troubles in order to portray herself as one who has suffered in profound ways.
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Allan’s migraines: ‘‘Not only can I not do the things that I want to do, I can’t do the
things I need to do. What employer is going to have me work for them if 3 days a
week I have to leave work to pick up my son from school because he has a
headache?’’ What this assessment overlooks, however, is the signiﬁcant extent to
which Faith’s own health problems have interfered with her daily functioning. As
Allan puts it, ‘‘She always has a migraine or something. She’s always tired or—like,
if she goes to the store, she just will have to lie down because she’s all out of breath,
body aches all over, just from going to the store, usually.’’
In giving an account of one’s pain, it seems that signiﬁcant sources of suffering
are strategically left out. To consider how Butler’s view of interruption can
illuminate my analysis of Faith’s narrative of family suffering, I now turn to a
deeper exploration of the interview encounter and the interlocutory scene it creates.
Below, I outline the pragmatic contours of this scene of address by describing the
medical anthropological research interview as a particular form of complaint that
produces typiﬁed accounts.
Genres of Complaint
Although Faith was assured that the researchers from our study were not afﬁliated
with the clinic or its staff, it is important to situate her interview narrative within the
context of waiting for health-care services, since she was interviewed prior to, and
on account of, Allan’s upcoming neurology appointment. In this interview setting,
the desire for medical relief ﬁgures prominently into the conditions of address.
Accordingly, Faith’s hopes and expectations for medical care shape her narrative in
important ways.
While medical anthropologists often go to great lengths to emphasize conﬁden-
tiality and distance themselves from the clinical domain, it is doubtful that research
participants accept such disassociations at face value. After all, in most cases, and
certainly here, the interview itself is wholly contingent on a patient’s relationship
with a particular institution. As a result, the interview forms a curious sort of
extension of the medical encounter in which patients may treat physicians—or the
medical establishment more broadly—as indirect addressees.
16
Along these lines, Kugelmann (1999) found that his research respondents, 14
adult residents of an inpatient pain management program, seized the interview as an
opportunity to voice a call to rectify their longtime suffering. Drawing on Levinas’
distinction between saying and the said, Kugelmann suggests that his interlocutors
were not merely reporting their experiences, but drawing him into a scene of address
that forced him to bear witness to their suffering. The illness narratives that
Kugelmann collected were thus articulated in the genre of complaint, fully imbued
16 Since I started work on this paper, I have begun dissertation ﬁeldwork in a clinic for children and
adolescents suffering from chronic pain. Because families typically meet me for an initial interview prior
to meeting any of the clinical staff, I have found that parents will occasionally project implicit
expectations that I will relay the extent of their child’s suffering—and the extensive measures they have
taken to relieve it—to their (as yet unknown) health care providers.
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narratives resembled legal proceedings, which recalls, I might add, Nietzsche’s
sense of giving an account of oneself. In some cases, the stakes of these accounts
were quite high, since the institutional requirements of health insurance and
worker’s compensation mandated that patients ‘‘prove’’ their pain before reim-
bursement. However, Kugelmann (1999, p. 1673) notes, ‘‘While a few were literally
plaintiffs in a legal sense, all were plaintiffs in existential terms.’’
In a similar fashion, Faith, in her interview, makes a plea for justice. Although
she spends some time reproaching the educators and family members who question
the legitimacy of Allan’s pain, a primary objective of Faith’s account is to
demonstrate Allan as deserving of medical care.
17 To this end, she poetically
articulates his profound suffering with the metaphoric imagery of a wet paper towel
(see above, ‘‘Illness History and Family Background’’) and the poignant suggestion
that Allan’s pain ‘‘has stolen time’’:
What the pain has done has stolen time…. It has, what the pain has done is it
has kept him from having fun with other children, because he doesn’t have
time to go out and make friends, because he can’t even attend Scout meetings
on a regular basis. What being in pain has done has kept him from being
involved in religious education like before.
Thus, despite Allan’s various mental and neurobehavioral difﬁculties, Faith
blames the migraines for his social problems. She also protests the inadequacy of his
prior medical treatment. For instance, she relays her dismay with a pediatrician’s
advice: ‘‘She said, ‘You’re doing the right thing. Continue to give him Tylenol.’ I’m
giving him Excedrin and she’s telling me to give him Tylenol. I’m looking at her
like she’s nuts. Tylenol doesn’t do squat for a migraine. What is she doing?’’ With
respect to the neurologist whom Allan saw prior to his move, Faith’s feelings are
ambivalent at best: ‘‘I think that he probably could have helped Allan. It might have
taken years. It was like the slow boat to China.’’
Faith also discusses some of her frustrations with her own medical care. She is
particularly irate that her doctors failed to consider the role of her sleep in her
migraines.
There’s so many things—how many years did I have migraines and did I have
headaches, and nobody, not one doctor ever thought that it might have
something to do with my sleep patterns. It wasn’t until I went in and had the
sleep study done, and then just coincidentally, my headaches went away. But
when I looked into it, I found out that one of the major symptoms of sleep
apnea are frequent headaches. Well, then how come headache doctors don’t
know that? You know, it makes me angry. It makes me really angry. If I can
ﬁnd out this stuff, then how come a specialist doesn’t know it? And that makes
me angry. It makes me very angry. I am not a specialist. I am an ignorant
17 On the uncertain ontological status of pain, see Das (1998), Hilbert (1984), Jackson (1992, 2005),
Scarry (1985), Trnka (2007) and Wittgenstein (1953).
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me angry.
18
As a result of this experience, one of Faith’s biggest hopes for Allan’s upcoming
neurology appointment is to have a sleep study scheduled. However, about his ﬁrst
neurologist, Allan says, ‘‘I couldn’t talk to him about the sleep study, and—
I couldn’t talk to the man. He wouldn’t let me get a word in edgewise.’’ Likewise,
Faith says, ‘‘I brought it up with [Allan’s] psychiatrist, who just said, ‘Uh-huh.’’’
It is important to note that this type of complaining characterizes health-care
encounters more broadly, and is not limited to interviews. When patients meet new
providers, they recount past treatment, often highlighting areas where medicine has
failed or otherwise left them unsatisﬁed. Moreover, because Faith and Allan have
dealt with many different clinicians and several different insurance providers, we
might assume that Faith has engaged in this type of ‘‘saying’’ repeatedly.
Building on Kugelmann’s discussion of the genre of complaint, I use the term to
highlight how anthropological research interviews in biomedical settings (and the
broader class of clinical encounters in which they are embedded) invoke certain
typiﬁed forms of suffering that call for the rectiﬁcation of perceived injustices.
However, while Kugelmann’s use of genre is drawn from Burke (1954) and Bruner
(1990), my use of this term here is also informed by Bakhtin’s (1986, p. 60) notion
of speech genres as ‘‘relatively stable types’’ of utterances that relate to speciﬁc
spheres of language use. For Bakhtin, it is crucial that ‘‘each speech genre in each
area of speech communication has its own typical conception of the addressee, and
this deﬁnes it as a genre’’ (p. 95). Language choice is thus structured by the speciﬁc
nature of the given context of address. This dialogic feature of genre-ed forms is
critical to my understanding of the particular narrative turns that Faith’s account
takes. In this sense, my view of genres of complaint is also in line with Wilce (1998,
p. 51), who suggests that ‘‘complaints must be recipient-designed if they are to
succeed at referential speciﬁcity.’’
The medical anthropological research interview—as a particular genre of
complaint shaped by the interaction of speciﬁc institutions, individuals, and
conditions of address—produces a form of interruption that resonates with Butler’s
(2005) view of narrative. What Butler offers is a conceptual language for thinking
through the distortions inherent to such interview accounts. According to Butler, the
rhetorical scene of address constitutes an interruption of narrative as much as a
feature of narrative itself.
The moment the story is addressed to someone, it assumes a rhetorical
dimension that is not reducible to a narrative function. It presumes that
18 Faith’s description of herself as an ‘‘ignorant amateur’’ forms a marked contrast to two previous
statements regarding her high IQ. First, when asked whether she had described to any physicians her
explanatory model of migraine pain—that the neurons had ‘‘gotten too much practice in hurting’’—Faith
replied, ‘‘Look. I have an IQ of 145, and all sorts of theories about everything, none of which anyone is
going to listen to.’’ Then, just before the extract quoted above occurred, in reference to the hoped-for
sleep study, Faith said, ‘‘The other thing that I think should be explored—you know, I’m not stupid.
I have a friggin’ IQ of 145. I read extensively.’’ The fact that Faith frames her intelligence and expertise
in such strikingly different manners is a testament to her rhetorical ingenuity. See also Ochs and Capps
(1996, p. 22) on ‘‘partial’’ selves.
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being done with language when the account that I give begins: it is invariably
interlocutory, ghosted, laden, persuasive, and tactical. It may well seek to
communicate a truth, but it can do this, if it can, only by exercising a relational
dimension of language (p. 63).
By posing the scene of address as a source of interruption, I do not mean to suggest
that Faith’s story exists as an a priori narrative that is violated whenever it enters the
social arena. Instead, I view interruption as part of the very fabric of social life, and
hence, narrative itself. If Faith’s life contains multiple narrative threads, as all lives
do, by fashioning her story in the genre of complaint, Faith necessarily pulls on some
of these threads while tucking others under. While many different social forces may
tug and pull at narratives, the structural dynamics of the interview encounter invoke a
more explicit form of interruption. Thus, in shifting from the mundane sorts of
narrative frames encountered in everyday social life (cf. Mattingly 1998) to a more
formal scene of address, Faith’s life story is transformed into a stylized type of
account. In the course of this process, a subtle violence is wrought.
What interests me here, and what Butler has helped me to explore, is the way in
which institutional dynamics and expectations play a role in bringing certain
narrative threads to the forefront. By invoking Butler’s concept of interruption, I aim
to highlight the ways in which genre-ed forms of complaint necessarily background
certain modes of suffering and, in turn, how narratives alter the conditions of address
and shape the interviewer’s line of questioning. In this sense, narrative interruptions
and silences are collaboratively produced. Following Butler (2005, p. 12), ‘‘The
refusal to narrate remains a relation to narrative and to the scene of address.’’
For Faith, the structure of addressivity mandates a particular performance of self.
Not only must she portray Allan as worthy of treatment, but also she must depict
herself as morally accountable within her story of his pain, and as a morally viable
advocate within the scene of address. To do this, she must downplay her
responsibility for her role in his suffering. In this respect, the ethics of care looms
large, since her failure to fulﬁll her maternal obligations, and Allan’s subsequent
move, had important ramiﬁcations for his health and well-being. Not only did
Allan’s temporary caregivers neglect a treatment regimen that by all accounts
appeared to be working—if only as what Faith terms a ‘‘Band-Aid’’ due to its short-
term, limiting relief—but also this living arrangement resulted in allegations of
abuse, as suggested by Allan’s cryptic reference to ‘‘one pain or another pain.’’
From Butler’s (2005, p. 12) perspective, Faith’s moral predicament is the
deﬁning feature of giving an account of oneself, which, as mentioned previously,
‘‘accepts the presumption that the self has a causal relation to the suffering of
others’’ (emphasis added). Insofar as Faith had a causal role to play in Allan’s
suffering, her account of his pain, within the conﬁnes of address, is necessarily
distorted. The dialogic nature of the research interview, as a genre of complaint,
thus creates a ‘‘presentational self’’ (Wilce 1998, p. 33) within which certain
historical events are strategically concealed. In this respect, the anthropological
research interview resembles other types of health-care encounters, such as Faith’s
repeated efforts to justify particular treatment strategies to new insurance carriers.
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with her brother are minor interludes from the central drama, not even quite side-
plots of their own. In contrast, the migraine forms a master trope in Faith’s narrative
of family distress. She says:
Because they prevent him from going to school, which is the number one most
important thing. But they also prevent him from going to Scouts, to church, to
birthday parties, to family get-togethers, like Thanksgiving dinners. You
know, it just goes on and on and on. It’s like he can’t live a normal life.
And yet, this explanation disregards the fact that it is quite unlikely—given his
signiﬁcant developmental delays and behavioral problems—that Allan would have
gone through childhood unmarked by difﬁculty, even without the migraines. In
Faith’s telling, bodily pain becomes a metonym for other forms of social and
emotional distress (Das 1997; see also Darghouth et al. 2006; Nichter 1981).
19
Between one pain and another, the migraine is far more easily narrated.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that illness narratives, as told within the interview
encounter, are necessarily fragmented, partial and rhetorical in nature. I began my
analysis with a question that troubled me as I poured over the interview transcripts:
Why did Faith foreground Allan’s migraines as the primary source of her suffering,
despite multiple other illnesses and family troubles? In crafting a response to this
question,Ihavesituatedtheanthropologicalresearchinterviewwithinaspeciﬁcscene
of address to examine some of the moral, relational and communicative challenges of
giving an account of one’s pain. Speciﬁcally, I have suggested that the medical
anthropological research interview, as a particular genre of complaint, makes a claim
forcertainretributiveethicaljudgmentsandthusprivilegescertaintypesofaccounts.I
have argued that a sort of narrative interruption can occur when narrators choose to
highlight ‘‘one pain or another pain.’’ When interviews are mired in medical and
juridical institutional structures, as is so often the case in medical anthropological
inquiry,whatisatstakewithsuchnarrativeturnsbecomesallthemoreconsequential.
Lest this view of illness narratives appear too critical, I want to make clear that I
recognize the signiﬁcant role that the literature associated with ‘‘narrative
medicine’’ (cf. Charon 2006) has come to play in breaking the silence surrounding
illness and suffering and giving people a voice in their health care. The tension
Mishler (1984) articulates between the ‘‘voice of medicine’’ and the ‘‘voice of the
lifeworld’’ is especially pertinent here, and has framed ongoing discussions
concerning how to more effectively incorporate patients’ own perspectives into
medical encounters. That a shift in tide of this nature should emanate from within
the ﬁeld of biomedical practice—Rita Charon, the pioneer of narrative medicine, is
a physician at Columbia University’s Presbyterian Hospital—is all the more
19 In this case, bodily pain erases what it metonymically indexes. I thank Jim Wilce for pointing this out
to me.
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Mattingly (2006, p. 568) notes, ‘‘An interest in narrative within the clinical world
has been linked to a concern with ethics—with how to provide a more humane, a
more ‘human-centered’ approach to health care.’’
To be clear, then, I do not mean to suggest that attending to patients’ stories of
illness and suffering is not a worthwhile pursuit, or to deny the appeal of narrative
medicine. Rather, I have tried to highlight some of the ways in which narratives
deployed in interview settings, while illuminating personal perspectives on pain and
suffering, also cast a deep shadow. In this way, giving an account of one’s pain is a
strategic and selective process, creating interruptions and silences as much as
moments of clarity. Therefore, I have suggested that medical anthropologists, in
eliciting illness narratives, ought to attend more closely to the institutional structures
and relations on which the practical success of much of their research is predicated.
For Allan, eating alone at lunchtime, being teased about his appearance and being
followed by a stalker were just as troubling as his chronic migraines, and occupied a
central place in his telling, as what Wikan (2000) might term his ‘‘compelling
concerns.’’ Although I have chosen here to concentrate on Faith’s account, a
secondary aim of this paper is to highlight the contrast between how a mother and
how a son portray a son’s suffering. In this case, the disjuncture between Faith’s and
Allan’s compelling concerns raises questions about the methodological practice of
interviewing only the patient or, in the case of a child, only his or her mother. My
analysis illuminates the potential beneﬁt of eliciting multiple perspectives in
medical anthropological inquiry. Faith’s and Allan’s stories and the discrepancies
between them point to the importance of analyzing what is left out when collecting
and analyzing illness narratives, accounts and complaints. As Wikan (2000) and
others have noted, stories leave us with many unanswered questions. And yet, as I
have shown, close analytic attention to the interactional framework of interview
encounter can provide us with many telling interpretive clues, which are worthy of
our critical attention.
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